The complexities of human rights and constitutional reform in the United Kingdom: Brexit and a Delayed Bill of Rights: Informing (on) the Process by Cochrane, Leanne & Boyle, Katie
The complexities of human rights and constitutional reform in the
United Kingdom: Brexit and a Delayed Bill of Rights: Informing (on)
the Process
Cochrane, L., & Boyle, K. (2018). The complexities of human rights and constitutional reform in the United
Kingdom: Brexit and a Delayed Bill of Rights: Informing (on) the Process. Northwestern Journal of Human
Rights, 16(1), 22-46. [2].
Published in:
Northwestern Journal of Human Rights
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Queen's University Belfast - Research Portal:
Link to publication record in Queen's University Belfast Research Portal
Publisher rights
© 2018 Northwestern University.
This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Queen's University Belfast Research Portal is retained by the author(s) and / or other
copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated
with these rights.
Take down policy
The Research Portal is Queen's institutional repository that provides access to Queen's research output. Every effort has been made to
ensure that content in the Research Portal does not infringe any person's rights, or applicable UK laws. If you discover content in the
Research Portal that you believe breaches copyright or violates any law, please contact openaccess@qub.ac.uk.
Download date:05. Apr. 2019
1 
 
 
 
The complexities of human rights and constitutional reform in the United Kingdom 
 
Brexit and a Delayed Bill of Rights: Informing (on) the Process 
 
Katie Boyle1 & Leanne Cochrane2 3 
 
 
The United Kingdom’s politicised and contested human rights framework has come under 
increasing pressure during recent periods of constitutional and political instability. The UK 
2016 referendum on membership of the European Union, the delayed repeal of the Human 
Rights Act 1998 and the proposals to enact a British Bill of Rights have all shaped the discourse 
at the national level around decisions to retain rights (or not) rather than progressively 
improve the human rights structure. The European Union and Council of Europe human rights 
frameworks act as important pillars of human rights and democracy under the UK constitution 
and each of the devolved constitutions. Constitutional processes such as Brexit risk further 
confusing an already incoherent and complex human rights framework. This lack of clarity in 
terms of the future of the human rights regime in the UK and devolved regions has meant that 
there has been a lack of constitutional safeguards in place to protect human rights and thus 
far insufficient parliamentary scrutiny. The impact at the supra-national level undermines the 
UK as a global actor and the impact at the devolved sub-national level is further fragmenting 
state unity where devolved jurisdictions are on different, and often more progressive, human 
rights trajectories. The UK is in the process of sleepwalking into a legal human rights deficit. 
We argue here that this lacunae in legal protections offers, if not necessitates, the opportunity 
to re-imagine human rights structures in a progressive way embedded in processes that must 
be genuinely deliberative, informed, participative and inclusive. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This article sets out the highly politicised and contested human rights legal framework 
in the United Kingdom in order to assess what kind of space human rights might occupy in 
the UK’s unique constitutional framework in the future. It does so in the context of two 
separate yet intertwined constitutional processes related to broader European frameworks.  
The first is the decision to leave the European Union (‘Brexit’), determined by a UK wide 
popular vote of 51.9% on 23 June 2016. 4 The second is the UK Government’s promise 
(currently on hold) to introduce a British Bill of Rights to replace the Human Rights Act 
1998, the statute that partially incorporates the European Convention on Human Rights into 
domestic law.5   
 
The purpose of the paper is first and foremost to tease out the complexity of the 
changing human rights frameworks (at the national and devolved levels).  It does so against a 
backdrop of constitutional and political instability in the UK; a matter of critical importance 
when the rights and processes associated with change are contested politically.  It speculates 
the potential impact of both reform processes, and ultimately advocates for a model of 
protection referred to as ‘EU/ECHR +’.  Such an outcome refers to substantive rights 
protection rather than just procedural form.  While the immediate concern is to ensure that 
rights protection is not undermined by either process, the article supports a deeper look at UK 
human rights law during but primarily post-Brexit. The ‘plus’ is intentionally not prescriptive 
beyond an advocacy for broader protection of socio-economic rights—in essence 
highlighting, in the first instance, the particular accountability gap in this area. We suggest 
that a more coherent human rights framework would more closely reflect the broader 
international human rights framework. However, we also caution that any consideration of 
how the human rights framework might change going forward should be predicated by an 
inclusive process that ensures lengthy deliberation across the jurisdictions that is fair, 
participative, democratic and informed.  The article engages beyond the local to address a 
European and international readership cognisant that the debates underpinning the reform 
processes will ruminate at a global level, not least, because of the nationalist overtones.  As 
such, the article adopts a deliberate broad brush to the constitutional context and issues at 
play, highlighting where relevant some key considerations for other liberal democracies also 
revisiting rights and democracy and their connection to supra-national and sub-national 
relationships in the current global climate.   
 
This article is divided into three core sections.  Section one seeks to do the necessary 
scene-setting establishing the constitutional status of human rights against which the reform 
processes currently take place.  Sections two and three look at the EU human rights 
framework and the Human Rights Act 1998 respectively, and their ongoing and future 
reform.  Section two queries how far the UK’s constitutional framework can go when on 
course to remove existing European pillars of democracy and human rights while section 
three considers whether calls to replace the Human Rights Act with a British Bill of Rights is 
                                                      
4 The Electoral Commission, EU Referendum Result, www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-
subject/elections-and-referendums/past-elections-and-referendums/eu-referendum/electorate-and-count-
information (England voted to leave with 53.2% vote and Wales with 51.7% vote; whereas, Scotland voted to 
remain with 62% vote and N.I. with 55.7% vote). 
5 THE CONSERVATIVE AND UNIONIST PARTY MANIFESTO 37 (2017), https://www.conservatives.com/manifesto. 
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a misdirection away from other more legitimate concerns.  All three sections incorporate a 
specific focus on devolution, a crucial and often under-considered element of the UK 
constitution in the context of human rights.  The article concludes by drawing together the 
comments of the two reform sections.  Constitutional transitions are difficult but perhaps 
there is an opportunity for the UK to avoid the path of retrogression in what promises to be a 
continuingly global world.    
 
A. Political Context 
 
By means of introduction it is important to note the political context of the processes 
of constitutional change. Both reform processes center on a desire to reclaim sovereignty by 
repatriating power from Europe to the UK – the notion of “taking back control” has been 
consistently invoked before the electorate.6  The briefing notes to the Queen’s Speech of 27 
May 2015 reasoned that a repeal of the Human Rights Act was necessary for the UK to “have 
more control over its affairs” and to “restore common sense to the application of human 
rights laws";7 while the Vote Leave referendum campaign conducted the following year 
adopted the phrase as a core mantra.8 
 
It is a sovereignty that traditionally (and consistently) is understood to rest with the 
Westminster Parliament, though both reform discourses also include the desire to see UK 
courts as the highest judicial authority.9  Yet the weeks and months that followed the EU 
referendum suggest another conception of sovereignty at play in the minds of the electorate, 
that of popular sovereignty.  The arguments which preceded the R (Miller) v. Secretary of 
State for Exiting the European Union, [2017] UKSC 5, [2017] 2 W.L.R. 583, jurisprudence10 
have served to highlight this dichotomy of perception, whereby the popular vote (as an 
exercise of direct democracy) is set at odds with parliamentary approval for major 
constitutional change.11 Polarising forms of direct and representative democracy, if not 
accommodated carefully, can threaten processes of constitutional change—such as was 
                                                      
6 ‘Taking Back Control From Brussels,’ Vote Leave Briefing Room, 
www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/briefing_control.html. For a discussion, see Sarah Longlands, A Year Since the 
UK Voted to Take Back Control - But Control of What?, LSE BRIT. POL. & POL’Y BLOG (June 23, 2017), 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/taking-back-control-one-year-on/. 
7 The Queen’s Speech 2015, Briefing Notes, Addressed to Both Houses of Parliament, 6, 75 (May 27, 2015).  
8 See Vote Leave Take Control, www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/. 
9 It should be acknowledged here that while a contested framework is at play at the national level surrounding 
concepts of sovereignty there is also sub-national frameworks at play further complicating the landscape. 
Scotland, for example, claims another form of constitutional sovereignty more firmly rooted in civic republican 
theory. For further discussion, see Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, A UK Exit from the EU: The End of the United 
Kingdom or a New Constitutional Dawn?, CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L & COMP. L., Oxford Legal Studies Research 
Paper No. 25 (Mar. 7, 2015). 
10 R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, [2017] 2 W.L.R. 583 (appeal 
taken from Eng. & Wales, and N.I.). 
11 On the contested and confused nature of these concepts during the EU Referendum campaign, see Sionaidh 
Douglas-Scott, Brexit, The Referendum and the UK Parliament: Some Questions about Sovereignty, U.K. 
CONST. L. BLOG (June 28, 2016), www.ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/06/28/sionaidh-douglas-scott-brexit-the-
referendum-and-the-uk-parliament-some-questions-about-sovereignty/ . 
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evident in the Miller case. The media portrayal of this contest vilified the judges as “enemies 
of the people” by handing back the decision to trigger Article 50 to Parliament following the 
referendum.12 Processes that involve amending the constitution tend to follow robust 
constitutional frameworks governed by a written constitution that carefully accommodates 
and entrenches rules regarding amendments through formal means subject to scrutiny through 
formal institutional processes.13 In the UK, referendums are fairly new constructs of an 
uncodified constitution. The flexibility of this polity perhaps left the door open to a cascade 
of constitutional disorder when a process of direct democracy was not only at odds with the 
representative makeup of parliament but also rejected the very nature of the constitution in 
and of itself.14 Indeed, Gordon has highlighted the threat exiting the EU poses for the very 
foundation of the UK constitution as a challenge both for—and of—the UK constitution.15  
 
With that in mind, there is a notable lack of clarity in the two human rights reform 
processes forming the subject of this article. The debate predicating the referendum did little 
to inform the electorate of the full consequences of human rights change; 16 a situation that 
has continued post vote. The Joint Committee on Human Rights reported its regret that the 
Government “has not been able to set out any clear vision as to how it expects Brexit will 
impact the UK’s human rights framework.”17  Separately, the House of Lords EU Committee 
was left “unsure why a British Bill of Rights was really necessary.”18  This lack of clarity at 
the national level has undoubtedly inhibited the ability of the electorate and public at large to 
engage in the discourse in an informed way.  It also poses problems in terms of adherence to 
the rule of law, another fundamental concept in the UK’s constitution which requires legal 
certainty (and which in its substantive definition includes a commitment to human rights).19  
                                                      
12 For an example of the headlines dominating the front pages following the decision, see Claire Phipps, British 
Newspapers React to Judges' Brexit Ruling: 'Enemies of the People, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 4, 2016), 
www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/nov/04/enemies-of-the-people-british-newspapers-react-judges-brexit-
ruling. 
13 Richard Albert, The Structure of Constitutional Amendment Rules, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 913 (2014). 
14 See, e.g., Martin Loughlin, The End of Avoidance, 38 LONDON REV. BOOKS 12 (2016). 
15 Michael Gordon, Brexit: A Challenge for the UK Constitution, of the UK Constitution?, 12 EUR. CONST. L. 
REV. 409, 435 (2016). 
16 See Katie Boyle & Leanne Cochrane, Rights Derived from EU Law: Informing the Referendum Process, U.K. 
CONST. L. BLOG (May 6, 2016), https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/04/13/katie-boyle-and-leanne-cochrane-
rights-derived-from-eu-law-informing-the-referendum-process/; Katie Boyle & Leanne Cochrane, Brexit and a 
British Bill of Rights: Four Scenarios for Human Rights, THE U.K. IN A CHANGING EUROPE (May 17, 2016), 
www.ukandeu.ac.uk/explainers/brexit-and-a-british-bill-of-rights-four-scenarios-for-human-rights/; Jo Murkens 
& Sarah Trotter, The Implications of Brexit for Fundamental Rights Protection in the UK, LSE EUR. INST. (Feb. 
25, 2016), www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/LSE-Commission/Hearing-6---The-implications-of-Brexit-for-
fundamental-rights-protection-in-the-UK.pdf. 
17 JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE HUMAN RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS OF BREXIT, 2016, HL 88, 9, HC 
695.  
18 HOUSE OF LORDS EU COMMITTEE, THE UK, THE EU AND A BRITISH BILL OF RIGHTS, 2016, HL 139, 46.  
19 For a substantive view see, TOM BINGHAM, THE RULE OF LAW (2011).  Lord Bingham’s assessment of the 
concept considers the rights protected by the Human Rights Act 1998 to be an appropriate starting point:  
“[t]here are probably rights which could valuably be added to the Convention, but none which could safely be 
discarded.” Note however, wider criticisms that a fully substantive approach to the rule of law “rob[s] the 
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The negativity underpinning the discourse on the current human rights framework, 
which sets it at odds with the UK’s legal sovereignty, is fuelling age-old perceptions of a 
tension between democracy and human rights with human rights regarded as a threat to the 
national interest.20 Indeed, the rule of law has long been recognised as not an “entirely 
harmonious bedfellow” with parliamentary sovereignty.21  It has been suggested that on 
deeper analysis this perception arises on the basis of only a narrow set of issues, namely 
terrorism, crime and immigration.22  Yet, it is suggested that there is an under-expressed link 
between the socio-economic rights legal framework and the topics that generate some of the 
greatest passion within UK policy debates, especially when debated in terms of an adequate 
standard of living.23  Examples include healthcare, economic opportunity and social 
welfare.24  Leaving the EU is likely to lead to a loss of the EU solidarity rights framework 
and the potential implications of this require further attention.25  
  
Adding to these complications is the divergence of perspectives over the two reforms 
among the UK’s constituent parts.  The negative human rights discourse is predominantly 
demonstrated by the UK Government and elements of the media.26  Prior to the referendum 
both the Scottish and Welsh Governments supported the retention of the role played by both 
EU law and the European Convention on Human Rights in the devolution settlements.27  The 
Welsh vote in favour of leaving the European Union by 51.7% has determined the Welsh 
                                                      
concept of any function which is independent of the theory of justice which imbues such an account of law.” For 
greater detail, see Paul Craig, Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: an Analytical 
Framework, PUB. L. 467, 487 (1997).  
20 David Feldman, Democracy, Law, and Human Rights: Politics as Challenge and Opportunity, in 
PARLIAMENTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: REDRESSING THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT 95-96 (Murray Hunt, Hayley J. 
Hooper & Paul Yowell eds., 2015)  (a viewpoint Feldman links with the media). See also THE CONSERVATIVE 
PARTY MANIFESTO 73 (2015), https://www.conservatives.com/manifesto2015.  
21 Bingham, supra note 19, at ix; see also T.R.S. ALLAN, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF LAW: FREEDOM, 
CONSTITUTION, AND COMMON LAW, 168-208 (2013). 
22 See Feldman, supra note 20, at 95–96.  
23 For a recent and seminal case referencing the minimum income in assessing the lawfulness of Employment 
Tribunal fees, see  R (on the application of UNISON) v. Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51, 3 W.L.R. 409 
(appeal taken from Eng. & Wales). 
24 William Jordan, Health Overtakes Immigration as an Issue for Voters, YOUGOV (Apr. 15, 2015), 
yougov.co.uk/news/2015/04/15/health-tops-immigration-second-most-important-issu/. For a list of issues 
identified as main concerns to voters in the UK EU referendum, see ELECTORAL COMMISSION, REFERENDUM ON 
MEMBERSHIP OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, ¶ 3.80 (2015), 
http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/192127/2015-08-17-EC-59a-15-Question-
assessment-report-draft-FULL.pdf. 
25 See Katie Boyle & Leanne Cochrane, Report from Human Rights in Transition: the Impact for the UK in a 
Changing Europe Roundtable, Univ. of Roehampton (May 17, 2016); and generally on the framework, Boyle & 
Cochrane, supra note 16. 
26 See, e.g., Tony Blair, Address at Open Britain (Feb. 17. 2017) (commenting on the role of the media in 
misleading voters pre and post Brexit), blogs.spectator.co.uk/2017/02/full-transcript-tony-blairs-brexit-speech/. 
27 HOUSE OF LORDS EU COMMITTEE, supra note 18, at 181. 
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Government’s embracing of Brexit28 but the overwhelming vote to the contrary in Scotland 
(62% voted to remain) has strengthened the Scottish Government’s resolve to forge an 
independent settlement deal for Scotland.29  These positions are of course influenced by the 
diverging jurisdictional perspectives on the constitutional status of the Union itself: the 
Scottish Government desire for independence; the Welsh First Minister’s proposals for a 
“new Union” or quasi-federalist state;30 and a Northern Ireland of slowly diminishing but 
enduring binary political divides, where approximately half the power-sharing Government 
(when in existence) also desire to be free from the Union. This has become all the more 
complicated under the most recent political alliance with the majority unionist party in 
Northern Ireland, the Democratic Unionist Party (“DUP”), now lending a majority to a 
minority Conservative Government which lost its majority in the June 2017 snap election. 
Whilst the DUP and the Conservative parties are firmly committed to reforming the human 
rights landscape in the UK (with what appears to be a view to removing the UK from the 
ECHR framework), as a government they are bound to comply with the British-Irish 
Agreement 1998 – the international treaty guaranteeing equality and human rights by 
embedding the ECHR in Northern Ireland after the Good Friday Agreement was reached in 
1998 (a deal the DUP opposed). At the same time as retrogressive steps are increasingly 
prevalent under the Conservative DUP coalition the Scottish First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon 
MP, has formed an expert panel to advice the Scottish Government on how to mitigate 
against the risk to human rights posed by Brexit with a specific focus on the principles of 
non-regression, ensuring an equivalence of rights post- Brexit and providing leadership on 
the future of rights protection. The Scottish Parliament has also legislated to protect EU rights 
post-Brexit. These diverging trajectories demonstrate the extent to which UK jurisdictions 
may drift further apart when the EU common framework is removed. 
    
These issues form the political backdrop against which the legal discussion in the 
following sections takes place.  Together this article encourages the reader to ask where next 
for UK human rights in a sui generis constitutional framework. 
 
I.   HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
 
 Since a core thesis of this article is to tease out the complexity of human rights law in 
the UK for an international readership, we first of all seek to set the constitutional scene 
regarding the level of protection accorded to human rights in law and the arrangements that 
govern the distribution of rights issues between the national and devolved governments.  This 
section culminates in a short explanation of the recent and seminal UK Supreme Court case 
of R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union,31 a judgment handed 
                                                      
28 See generally, Welsh Government White Paper on Securing Wales’ Future: Transition from the European 
Union to a New Relationship with Europe (2017), https://beta.gov.wales/sites/default/files/2017-
01/30683%20Securing%20Wales%C2%B9%20Future_ENGLISH_WEB.pdf. 
29 See generally Scottish Government White Paper on Scotland’s Place in Europe (Dec. 20, 2016), 
http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0051/00512073.pdf. 
30 Carwyn Jones, Minister of Wales, Keynote Address at the Institute for Government, Our Future Union: 
Perspective from Wales (Oct. 15, 2014), www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/events/keynote-speech-rt-hon-
carwyn-jones-am-minister-wales-our-future-union-%E2%80%93-perspective-wales. 
31 R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, [2017] 2 W.L.R. 583.   
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down on January 24, 2017, and which dealt with both aforementioned facets of the 
constitution. 
 
A. Common law and statutory rights protection 
 
Human rights protections within the UK derive from both statutory and common law 
provisions.  Rights emanating from the common law primarily concern civil rights and 
liberties such as the freedoms of expression and assembly, along with the rights to life, liberty 
and of access to justice.  The development of such rights was superseded (until relatively 
recently32) by the introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998, which incorporates the 
European Convention on Human Rights into domestic law and, albeit to a lesser extent, the 
rights contained within EU law. 
 
The UK’s constitution is famously uncodified.  It operates under the auspice of 
various constitutional sources including under a set of constitutional principles, most notably 
that of parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law.  Professor Dicey delivered the orthodox 
exposition on the principle of parliamentary sovereignty when he defined it to mean that 
Parliament has “the right to make or unmake any law whatever; and further, that no person or 
body is recognised by the law […] as having the right to override or set aside the legislation 
of Parliament”.33  As will be seen from the discussion of Miller below, parliamentary 
sovereignty remains the enduring constitutional paradigm within UK law.  In terms of the 
protection of human rights however, the principle has been subjected, under the rule of law, 
to judicial rules of interpretation, such that common law rights and certain statutes which 
protect rights are today considered to have a degree of superiority over other more “ordinary” 
legislative provisions.  Such rights have in effect taken on a constitutional status.   
 
 In R v. Lord Chancellor, ex parte Witham, [1997] EWHC Admin 237, [1998] QB 
575, for example, a case which concerned the common law right of access to the courts, the 
England and Wales High Court announced that such rights “cannot be abrogated by the State 
save by specific provision in an Act of Parliament…[g]eneral words will not suffice.”34  Two 
years later, in R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Simms [1999] 
                                                      
32 The Conservative discourse that has endured for a number of years now concerning a potential repeal of the 
Human Rights Act has seemingly resulted in a resurgence in judicial reliance on common law rights protection. 
See, e.g., Kennedy v. The Charity Commission [2014] UKSC 20 para 46, [2015] A.C. 455 (appeal taken from 
Eng. & Wales) (“The development of the common law did not come to an end on the passing of the Human 
Rights Act 1998. It is in vigorous health…Greater focus in domestic litigation on the domestic legal position 
might also have the incidental benefit that less time was taken in domestic courts seeking to interpret and 
reconcile different judgments (often only given by individual sections of the European Court of Human Rights) 
in a way which that Court itself, not being bound by any doctrine of precedent, would not itself undertake.”) 
(internal quotations omitted; See,, e.g., R (Evans) v. Attorney General [2015] UKSC 21, [2015] A.C. 1787 
(appeal taken from Eng. & Wales); O (A Child) v. Rhodes [2015] UKSC 32, [2016] A.C. 219 (appeal taken 
from Eng. & Wales); Lady Hale, Keynote Address to the  Constitutional and Administrative Law Bar 
Association Conference 2014, UK Constitutionalism on the March? (Jul. 12, 2014).  For a recent overview of 
common law rights and the Human Rights Act, see MICHAEL TUGENDHAT, LIBERTY INTACT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
ENGLISH LAW (2016). 
33 A.V. DICEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 40 (10th ed. 1965).  
34 R v. Lord Chancellor, ex parte Witham, [1997] EWHC 237, [1998] QB 575, ¶ 13. 
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UKHL 33, [2000] 2 AC 115 (appeal taken from Eng. & Wales), Lord Hoffman for the House 
of Lords drew parallels between this approach, known as the “principle of legality”, and the 
principles of constitutionality applied in countries that possess a written constitution: noting 
there to be “little differen[ce]”.35  Lord Hoffman further identified the principle of legality’s 
importance as a check on unintentional interference with fundamental rights by Parliament 
when he considered its effect to mean that “Parliament must squarely confront what it is 
doing and accept the political cost,” otherwise, “there is too great a risk that the full 
implications of their unqualified meaning may have passed unnoticed in the democratic 
process.”36 
 
 Following the Simms jurisprudence regarding common law rights, a further principle 
of statutory construction was developed in the case of Thoburn v Sunderland City Council 
[2002] EWHC 195 (Admin), [2003] Q.B. 151 whereby legislation that “(a) conditions the 
legal relationship between citizen and State in some general, overarching manner, or (b) 
enlarges or diminishes the scope of what we would now regard as fundamental constitutional 
rights” would not be subject to the doctrine of implied repeal.37  To repeal such statutes, the 
more recent statute must do so expressly.  In Thoburn, Laws LJ of the Court of Appeal 
referred to such legislation as “constitutional statutes,”38 a term that while by no means 
abandoned by the UK courts, is being gradually recrafted into a more general focus on 
“constitutional principle(s)”39 or the “constitutional character” of a particular provision.40  
What is significant is that the devolved statutes, the Human Rights Act 1998 and the 
European Communities Act 1972-the legislative “conduit pipe” through which EU law and 
accompanying rights form part of domestic law41—have been consistently recognised by the 
UK courts to have the necessary constitutional character to elevate them above other 
statutes.42   
                                                      
35 R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Simms [1999] UKHL 33, [2000] 2 AC 115 (appeal 
taken from Eng. & Wales). 
36 Id. 
37 Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195, [2003] Q.B. 156, ¶ 62.  The doctrine of implied 
repeal presumes that subsequent primary legislation will repeal earlier conflicting provisions, and applies in the 
ordinary case. 
38 Id. 
39 R (HS2 Action Alliance Ltd) v. Secretary of State for Transport, [2014] UKSC 3, ¶ 79, [2014] 1 W.L.R. 324 
(appeal taken from Eng. & Wales). 
40 R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, [2017] UKSC 5, ¶ 67, [2017] 2 W.L.R. 
583.at  For Lord Neuberger’s reluctance to comment on whether the Government of Wales Act 2006 should be 
approached as a constitutional enactment in the reference, see Local Government Byelaws (Wales) Bill 2012 
[2012] UKSC 53, 69 [2013] 1 A.C. 792. 
41 R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, ¶ 65, [2017] 2 W.L.R. 583 
(adopting the term of Professor Finnis).  
42 In the HS2 case, the UK Supreme Court appeared to suggest that among competing constitutional provisions, 
there is also a hierarchical structure pertaining to the fundamentality of the underlying constitutional norm at 
issue. See, R (HS2 Action Alliance Ltd) v. Secretary of State for Transport [2014] UKSC 3, ¶ 207, [2014] 1 
W.L.R. 324. For a detailed discussion, see Mark Elliott, Constitutional Legislation, European Union Law and 
the Nature of the United Kingdom’s Contemporary Constitution 10 (3) EUR. CONST. L. REV. 379 (2014). 
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 The standing of human rights within the UK Constitution has served as a measure of 
protection against human rights reform in the form of Brexit.  In Miller for example 
(discussed further below), the UK Supreme Court, partly on the basis of Simms, prevented 
the UK Government from legally notifying the EU of the UK’s intention to leave without the 
prior authorization of Parliament.  The Supreme Court perceived the European Union as an 
important source of domestic rights and given that Brexit will remove certain of these rights, 
Parliament must first expressly authorize the withdrawal notification.43  For those still in 
doubt, the Miller jurisprudence highlights the nature of Brexit as a human rights reform issue.  
 
B. Devolution and the Sewel Convention 
 
The devolved legislatures cannot amend the Human Rights Act 199844 nor can either 
the devolved executives or legislatures act in a manner that is incompatible with EU law or 
the Convention rights.45   Beyond this however it is generally considered the case that the 
Scottish and Northern Irish legislatures have the power to legislate on human rights because 
it is not a matter that has been “reserved,” or in the case of Northern Ireland also “excepted,” 
to the Westminster Parliament.46  At the time of writing, Wales operates under a conferred 
powers model and cannot therefore exercise a general competence on human rights, however, 
the Welsh Assembly has passed progressive devolved legislation that expands human rights 
protections (such as the Rights of Children and Young Persons Measure 2011 imposing a 
duty to have due regard to the UN Convention of the Rights of the Child). The Welsh 
constitutional arrangement is due for imminent change in April 2018 once section 3(1) of the 
Wales Act 2017 comes into force taking Wales to a reserved powers model.47   
 
 The devolved legislatures and the Westminster Parliament avoid stepping on each 
other’s toes by operation of a political convention known as “Sewel”. Recently enshrined in 
Scottish and Welsh devolution legislation,48 the Sewel Convention means that the 
Westminster Parliament will not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters without 
the consent of the devolved legislatures via a Legislative Consent Motion. 49  Additionally, 
                                                      
43 R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, ¶ 87, [2017] 2 W.L.R. 583. 
44 Scotland Act 1998, sch. 4; Northern Ireland Act 1998, § 7(1); Government of Wales Act 2006, sch. 5. 
45 See Scotland Act 1998, §§ 29, 57(2), 126; Northern Ireland Act 1998, §§ 6, 24, 81, 83, 98; Government of 
Wales Act 2006, §§ 81, 94, 108, 158. The interpretation sections denoted in this list stipulate that the term 
“Convention rights” is to be interpreted as having “the same meaning as in the Human Rights Act 1998.” 
46 Scotland Act 1998, § 29, sch. 5; Northern Ireland Act, §§ 5-8, and sch. 2-3. 
47 For the conferred powers model, see the Government of Wales Act 2006, § 108. For information regarding 
the implementation of Section 3(1) of the Wales Act 2017, see the Wales Act 2017 (Commencement No. 4) 
Regulations 2017. 
48 Scotland Act 2016, § 2; Wales Act 2017, § 2. 
49 See Memorandum of Understanding and Supplementary Agreements, 14 (Oct. 2013), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/316157/MoU_between_the_UK_
and_the_Devolved_Administrations.pdf. See also Scotland Act 2016, § 2; Wales Act 2017, § 2; Devolution 
Guidance Note 8: Post-Devolution Legislation Affecting Northern Ireland,GOV.UK, (first publ. Apr. 23, 2011), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/60983/post-
devolution-primary-ni.pdf; Devolution Guidance Note 10: Post-Devolution Primary Legislation Affecting 
Scotland, GOV.UK (first publ. Apr. 23, 2011), 
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Cabinet Guidance directs that when Westminster primary legislation seeks to alter the 
competences of the devolved legislatures and of the devolved Ministers (as opposed to 
legislating on a devolved matter), the consent of the devolved legislature should normally be 
sought.50  
 
C. R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union  
 
The process by which the UK will leave the EU is set out in Article 50 TEU.  
According to paragraph 1, any member may leave “in accordance with its own constitutional 
requirements.”51 In terms of EU engagement, the UK Government must first “notify” the 
European Council of its intent.52  The EU and UK will then negotiate and conclude an 
agreement for withdrawal.53  From the EU side, any withdrawal agreement will be concluded 
by a qualified majority of the Council, after obtaining the consent of the European 
Parliament.54  In the event that no withdrawal agreement is reached within two years from the 
point of notification, the EU Treaties will automatically cease to apply to the UK, unless the 
Council and the UK unanimously decides to extend that period.55  This would require each of 
the remaining 27 Member States to approve any extension of the two year timeline.   
 
The applicants in R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union 
questioned the UK’s “constitutional requirements” concerning the role of Parliament, partly 
in relation to rights established in statute.56  They argued that the prerogative power held by 
the UK Government to make and resile from treaties could not be legally exercised to trigger 
Article 50 TEU because that power does not in fact exist where its exercise would nullify or 
frustrate domestic law.  This was particularly the case where domestic law involves rights or 
a scheme created by Parliament, based in part on the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty.57   
 
 The majority of the court accepted the core argument of the applicants.58  Since EU 
law had become a source of UK domestic law by virtue of an Act of Parliament, the UK 
                                                      
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/60985/post-
devolution-primary-scotland.pdf . See also, new Devolution Guidance Note: Parliamentary Assembly Primary 
Legislation Affecting Wales, GOV.UK (Apr. 20, 2018), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/701462/DGN
_-_Parliamentary_and_Assembly_Primary_Legislation_Affacting_Wales.pdf. 
50 See Devolution Guidance Note 8, supra note 49, at 4-5; Devolution Guidance Note 10, supra note 49, at 4-6; 
new Devolution Guidance Note: Parliamentary Assembly Primary Legislation Affecting Wales, supra note 49, 
at 69-70. 
51  Treaty on the European Union, art. 50(1), Jun. 7, 2016, 2016 O.J. (C 202) [hereinafter TEU]. 
52  Art. 50(2) TEU. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Art. 50(3) TEU. 
56 R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, [2017] UKSC 5, [2017] 2 W.L.R. 583.  
57 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 18:20, R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, 
[2017] UKSC 5, [2017] 2 W.L.R. 583,  https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/draft-transcript-thursday-161208-
four-page.pdf. 
58 R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, [2017] UKSC 5, ¶ 83 [2017] 2 W.L.R. 583. 
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Government could only exercise its prerogative powers in the intended manner if Parliament 
had first made clear its intention for this to be the case.59  Parliamentary sovereignty was after 
all “conclusively established” as “a fundamental principle of the UK constitution.”60  Resting 
on the Simms jurisprudence the Court stated that:    
 
[W]e cannot accept that, [in] . . . .  the 1972 Act, Parliament “squarely 
confront[ed]” the notion that it was clothing ministers with the far-reaching 
and anomalous right to use a treaty-making power to remove an important  
source of domestic law and important domestic rights.61 
 
A key presumption underpinning the Miller jurisprudence was the irrevocability of 
Article 50 TEU,62  an issue on which the Treaty is silent and which could only be finally 
determined by the CJEU.63  That is, once a state notifies it is leaving the EU, it cannot take 
this notification back.  It has been a point of criticism that the Supreme Court chose not to 
seek a preliminary reference on the revocability of Article 50 before issuing its judgment.64  
Incidentally, the Court was also quick to dismiss any suggestion that the EU referendum had 
dispensed with the requirement for Parliamentary authority.65   
 
The UK Supreme Court was also asked in Miller to determine whether the 
Westminster legislation it had deemed to be necessary before Article 50 TEU could be 
triggered should be preceded by a legislative consent motion from the devolved legislatures.66  
Despite the Sewel Convention gaining legislative entrenchment, the Court determined that 
the consent of the devolved legislatures was not legally required.  The rationale being that the 
Convention nevertheless remained of a political nature and as such “the policing and scope of 
its operation does not lie within the constitutional remit of the judiciary, which is to protect 
the rule of law.”67 
 
                                                      
59 Id. at ¶ 87. 
60 Id. at ¶ 41-43. 
61 Id. at ¶ 87. 
62 Id. at ¶ 169. 
63 An application was filed in January 2017 by London barrister Jolyon Maugham QC with the Dublin High 
Court seeking a legal ruling on whether the UK (or any other Member States) can unilaterally withdraw its 
notification under Article 50 once made (the ‘Dublin case’).  This case was however discontinued in May 2017 
citing lack of Irish Government support and timing concerns. See Jolyon Maugham, Sometimes You Try and 
You Do Not Succeed, WAITING FOR GODOT (May 29, 2017), waitingfortax.com/2017/05/29/sometimes-you-try-
and-you-do-not-succeed/. 
64 See e.g., Philip Allott, Taking Stock of the Legal Fallout from the EU (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017, 
U.K. CONST. L. BLOG (Feb. 2, 2017), ukconstitutionallaw.org/2017/02/02/philip-allott-taking-stock-of-the-legal-
fallout-from-the-eu-notification-of-withdrawal-act-2017/. 
65 R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, [2017] UKSC 5, ¶ 38 [2017] 2 W.L.R. 583. 
66 The question was initially raised in two NI High Court applications. See McCord’s (Raymond) Application,  
[2016] NIQB 85, [2017] 2 C.M.L.R. 7. 
67 R (Miller) v.  Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, [2017] UKSC 5, ¶ 151 [2017] 2 W.L.R. 583. 
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 The UK Government responded swiftly to the Supreme Court’s decision by 
introducing skeletal legislation to Parliament.  The European Union (Notification of 
Withdrawal) Act 2017 simply provides that the Prime Minister may notify, under Article 
50(2) TEU the UK’s intention to withdraw from the EU; and that no provision made under 
the European Communities Act 1972 may affect that power.  Amendments made by the 
House of Lords during legislative passage to safeguard the rights of EU citizens’ residing in 
the UK and to require approval of the negotiation agreement from both Houses of Parliament 
were rejected by the Commons.68   As such the Act did not include any information on the 
changes to the rights framework which may arise from Brexit - a missed opportunity to 
engender goodwill with the EU prior to the start of the negotiations.  Neither did the Act 
commit Parliament to rights scrutiny.  Despite the higher status accorded to rights protections 
within the UK’s constitutional framework, such rights can still be overridden by a simple Act 
of Parliament with express language.  The sufficiency of political will within Parliament is 
therefore crucial to ensuring adequate rights protections within UK law.  At present, despite 
an awareness of the issue among the parties, Parliamentary will on the matter is languishing 
behind the populist calls to assert national sovereignty, and is moreover being mistakenly 
positioned as in opposition to that objective.     
 
II.  EU HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND BREXIT 
 
So what are the human rights implications of Brexit? The intention of the government 
has been to maintain a degree of legal certainty for UK citizens by ensuring that pre-Brexit 
EU law remains in force in the UK, where practicable, until such a time as it can be 
individually reviewed and potentially repealed.69  As such, some aspects of EU law, we are 
told, will remain part of UK law for the foreseeable future—until such time as parliament 
expressly repeals it. In fact the Government’s White Paper has explicitly promised to protect 
and enhance EU derived workers’ rights.70 Nonetheless, concrete proposals on how this will 
be achieved are yet to be provided. In addition, and on closer inspection, we can see that the 
impact may indeed be much more serious for human rights protections in the UK with the 
inevitable loss of rights and remedies derived from the much broader EU framework. In 
particular the rights at risk include equality provisions,71 the right to a fair trial and access to 
justice/ effective remedies,72 and the yet untapped potential reach of social rights under the 
                                                      
68 13 Mar. 2017, Parl Deb HC (2017) cols. 73-82 (UK). 
69 DEPARTMENT FOR EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE UNITED KINGDOM’S EXIT FROM, AND NEW 
PARTNERSHIP WITH, THE EUROPEAN UNION, 2017, Cm. 9417, at 1.1 (UK), 
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/589191/The_United_Kingdoms_exit_fr
om_and_partnership_with_the_EU_Web.pdf. 
70 Id. 
71 UK equality law derives significantly from the EU legal framework, including the general treaty provision.   
72 The jurisprudence of the ECJ on remedies and Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 47, 
Jun. 7, 2016, 2016 O.J. (C 202). [hereinafter EU CFR], through cases such as, Judgment of 22 December 2010, 
Case C-279/09 “DEB” (OJ 2010 C 55, p. 9), Judgment of 18 March 2010 Case C-317-320/08, “Alassini”, (OJ 
2010 C 134, p. 3-4)  and Judgment of 14 June 2011 Case C-360/09, “Pfleiderer” (OJ 2011 C 232, p. 5-6).  The 
original jurisprudence of the CJEU on remedies started from the principle of national procedural autonomy with 
limited harmonisation.  This was true subject to the principles of ‘effectiveness’ (national law should not make it 
virtually impossible to bring an EU law) and ‘equivalence’ (national law should not treat the EU claim any less 
favourably than a claim brought under national law).  In the DEB case, the ECJ started a shift from the 
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solidarity framework.73  Furthermore, the existing rights of non-UK EU citizens living and 
working in the UK who were not part of the EU referendum plebiscite now feature as a 
“bargaining chip” in the post-referendum negotiations.74 As noted by Lock, the biggest threat 
to human rights as a result of Brexit is that withdrawal from the EU framework opens the 
door to human rights regression in all of the areas engaging with EU law.75 We have 
consistently raised concerns that it is the threat to rights not currently protected by the ECHR, 
in particular socio-economic rights (and the yet untapped potential of the EU Charter) that 
poses the biggest loss as well as the associated remedies.76  
 
In the Miller case, the Supreme Court emphasised the centrality of rights to the 
process of Brexit— finding that the triggering of Article 50 by notifying withdrawal from the 
EU would result in a fundamental change in the constitutional arrangements of the United 
Kingdom.77 This fundamental change occurs because the process of exiting the EU results in 
the loss of rights and remedies deriving from EU law.78  
 
 EU rights continue to be in a state of constant flux. In fact, the ambit of the rights and 
remedies which are incorporated into domestic law under section 2 of the 1972 Act varies 
with the UK’s obligations “from time to time” under the treaties.79 Their interpretation relies 
significantly on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). This comes as no 
surprise given, for example, the absence of clearly defined rights, as opposed to principles, in 
the European Charter of Fundamental Rights.80 Relying on courts to give meaning to rights is 
not unusual practice and it would seem this ad hoc formation of rights through the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ and national courts was perhaps deliberate if not unavoidable.81 De 
                                                      
traditional approach towards a focus on Art. 47.   In Alassini, the ECJ applies both approaches, ie. the principles 
of ‘effectiveness’ and ‘equivalence’ fi 
rst and then after that, Art. 47.  The nature of the jurisprudence and the tests applied under Art. 47 are different 
from the traditional approach to remedies.  In Pfleiderer, the ECJ had the opportunity to apply Art. 47 but 
choose not to – again reflecting an oscillating jurisprudence.     
73 The EU CFR will not be incorporated into UK law post-Brexit. 
74 Ruvi Zeigler, Logically Flawed, Morally indefensible: EU Citizens in the UK are Bargaining Chips, BREXIT 
BLOG LSE (Feb. 16, 2017), http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2017/02/16/logically-flawed-morally-indefensible-eu-
citizens-in-the-uk-are-bargaining-chips/. 
75 Tobias Lock, Human Rights Law in the UK after Brexit 117-18 (Edinburgh Law Sch. Pub. Law, Research 
Paper No. 17, 2017.  
76 Boyle & Cochrane, supra note 25; Boyle & Cochrane, Brexit and a British Bill of Rights, supra note 16 at 3; 
Katie Boyle, What are the consequences for human rights if we change our relationship with the EU? THE U.K. 
IN A CHANGING EUROPE (Apr. 13, 2016), http://ukandeu.ac.uk/explainers/what-are-the-consequences-for-
human-rights-if-we-change-our-relationship-with-the-eu/. 
77 R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, [2017] UKSC 5, ¶ 78-81 [2017] 2 W.L.R. 
583. 
78 Id. at ¶ 80. 
79 Id. at ¶ 76; European Communities Act 1972, c. 68, § 2 (UK.). 
80 Koen Lenaerts, Exploring the Limits of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 8 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 375 
(2012). 
81 Id. at 399. 
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Vries has indeed argued that the court may be “generating its own meaning” for rights.82 The 
UK government has established a consistent line in negotiations to “bring an end” to the 
jurisdiction of the ECJ in Britain post-Brexit83 and that the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights is not to be incorporated into UK law.84 The President of the UK Supreme Court has 
called on parliament “to be very clear” in explaining what UK judges are to do with decisions 
of the ECJ or any other EU topic after Brexit, indicating that the proposed EU (Withdrawal) 
Bill is not yet fit for purpose.85  In Scotland, the Scottish Parliament has passed legislation 
that seeks to protect both the Charter and the general principles of EU law meaning the courts 
in Scotland can continue to strike down any law or action that contravenes existing EU law in 
devolved areas.86 
 
 Before the referendum took place we further argued that greater attention on the 
implications for rights protection was required in order to support an informed and 
deliberative referendum process.87 Others too cautioned that the discourse had not yet 
engaged with the vast potential consequences of Brexit on the UK constitutional framework – 
particularly in relation to the implications for human rights protection.88  
 
 In April 2016 we noted four areas of major concern in the post-Brexit rights 
landscape: (i) the loss of citizenship rights; (ii) the loss of rights derived from general 
principles of EU law; (iii) the loss of rights derived from EU treaties, including the loss of 
rights derived from the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights; and (iv) the loss of rights derived 
from regulations and directives which engage with human rights either directly or 
indirectly.89 Examples of rights deriving from regulations include rights associated with the 
                                                      
82 SYBE DE VRIES  ET AL. (EDS.), THE EU CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AS A BINDING INSTRUMENT—
FIVE YEARS OLD AND GROWING (2015). 
83  Tobias Lock, A Role for the ECJ After Brexit?, EUROPEAN FUTURES FORUM ( Jul. 3, 2017). 
www.europeanfutures.ed.ac.uk/article-4872  (citing the Theresa May Lancaster House speech where she 
promised to “bring an end to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice in Britain”).  
84 DEPARTMENT FOR EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION, LEGISLATING FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM’S WITHDRAWAL 
FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION 2.25 (Mar. 2017). 
85 Clive Coleman, UK judges need clarity after Brexit - Lord Neuberger, BBC NEWS (Aug. 8, 2017) , 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-40855526. 
86 Clause 5(2)(b) of the UK Withdrawal from the European Union (Legal Continuity) (Scotland) Bill seeks to 
retain many of the rights and remedies in Scots law after withdrawal as would have been available before 
withdrawal, including the right of the courts to strike down legislation incompatible with the EU CFR and EU 
general principles. UK Withdrawal from the European Union (Legal Continuity) (Scotland) Bill 2018-5, SP Bill 
[28] cl. 5 (Scot.). Nonetheless, other routes to remedy, such as access to the Court of Justice of the European 
Union remain uncertain.  
87 See Boyle & Cochrane, supra note 16; Boyle supra note 76.  
88 See e.g. Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, What Happens to ‘Acquired Rights’ in the Event of a Brexit?, U.K CONST. 
L. BLOG (May 16, 2016), https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/05/16/sionaidh-douglas-scott-what-happens-to-
acquired-rights-in-the-event-of-a-brexit/ ; See also  Piet Eeckhout, The Real Record of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, U.K CONST. L. BLOG. (May 6, 2016), https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/05/06/piet-
eeckhout-the-real-record-of-the-eu-charter-of-fundamental-rights/. 
89 For further discussion of these various categories see Boyle & Cochrane, Rights Derived from EU Law: 
Informing the Referendum Process, supra note 16. 
15 
 
coordination of national security systems90 and the corresponding right to social security.91 
Examples of rights deriving from directives include directives on child sexual abuse,92 
trafficking in human beings,93 data protection,94 gender equality in employment,95 and racial 
equality.96 We noted that the remedies currently available under EU law for breach of an EU 
right will also no longer be available. Remedies include the disapplication of primary law.97 
This is a much stronger remedy than available under the Human Rights Act for a violation of 
an ECHR right.98  
 
 We argued that the consequences were so vast and potentially so far reaching that the 
complexity of disentangling the UK from the EU framework whilst also dealing with 
potential changes to the partially incorporated nature of the European Convention of Human 
Rights under the Human Rights Act 1998 would be incredibly problematic (if not careless). 
This argument was contextualised as part of a broader concern that it was becoming 
increasingly difficult to ensure that voters had access to the necessary information for an 
informed vote and that this in turn could have a significant detrimental impact on the 
deliberative quality of the constitutional referendum process in and of itself. 99  The 
revelations emerging in relation to Cambridge Analytica and widespread manipulation in 
both the US election and the UK EU referendum raise serious concerns about whether the 
electorate were misinformed to the extent that an informed vote was significantly impeded.100 
There is also a lack of clarity in post-vote negotiation process. It is entirely unclear what kind 
of post-Brexit rights landscape might exist and whether the UK will indeed continue to 
protect existing rights and if so to what extent. Inevitably some rights and remedies will be 
lost irrevocably – others may be protected in the immediate aftermath but could be eroded 
over time. There will be no obligation on subsequent administrations to retain the same level 
of protection that the current government might guarantee; given the nature of the UK 
                                                      
90 For example, Regulation (EC) 883/ 2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (29 April 2004) on 
the coordination of national security systems falling within the framework of free movement of persons and 
contributing towards improving their standard of living and conditions of employment. 
91 Art. 34 EU CFR. 
92 Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (13 December 2011). 
93 Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (5 April 2011). 
94 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (24 October 1995). 
95 Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (5 July 2006). 
96 Council Directive 2000/43/EC (29 June 2000). 
97 See R v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex p. Factortame (No 2) [1991] 1 AC 603 at 658 – 659, [1990] 3 
W.L.R. 818 (appeal taken from Eng. & Wales, reference made to E.C.J.); Benkharbouche v. Secretary of State 
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2017] UKSC 62, 78, [2017] 3 WLR 957 (on appeal from Eng. & 
Wales); and Google Inc v. Vidal-Hall [2015] EWCA Civ 311, [2016] Q.B. 1003. 
98 See Hirst discussion infra Part III .The strongest remedy available under the HRA for an incompatible 
primary legislation is a declaration of incompatibility, which has no impact on the operative provision. 
99 Boyle & Cochrane, supra note 16; Boyle supra note 76. 
100 See Carole Cadwalladr, The Cambridge Analytica Files, Tʜᴇ Gᴜᴀʀᴅɪᴀɴ (Mar. 18, 2018) 
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/data-war-whistleblower-christopher-wylie-faceook-nix-
bannon-trump. 
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constitution and parliament’s prerogative to repeal this opens the door to regressive measures 
on fundamental rights. 
 
 In any event, there is no provision made for the vast array of EU derived rights in the 
EU (Withdrawal) Bill.  The use (or abuse) of delegated legislation risks undermining 
parliamentary oversight even further.101 The UK constitution facilitates a form of legislation 
which allows parliament to pass primary legislation which thereafter enables secondary 
legislation to be passed by the executive without the need to go through full parliamentary 
scrutiny. These delegated powers, also known as Henry VIII powers, can undermine 
parliamentary scrutiny of potential changes to the human rights regime. Whilst the EU 
(Withdrawal) Bill places the Human Rights Act 1998 outside the remit of delegated 
legislation,102 the vast array of rights derived from other sources of EU law are not 
guaranteed by this exemption. Notably the same exemption is not applied to the Equality Act 
2010 which largely implements the EU equality related directives. 
 
 Nonetheless, the EU human rights framework will most likely retain continuing 
relevance. As part of the negotiation process the EU may seek to ensure that any future 
agreement with the UK does not compromise its own human rights standards. This has often 
formed a prerequisite of negotiation with third country agreements with other countries 
outside of the EU.103 It may form part of a prerequisite for future trade negotiations.104  
Whilst the general ambivalence towards social rights in the EU is evident,105 there is also a 
need to reflect on the fact that the Charter places civil and political rights on the same footing 
as economic and social rights – even if this equality is more “apparent than real.”106 That is 
not to say the direction of the court may not change in the future – particularly with the 
introduction of the EU Social Rights Pillar. The EU may therefore have a role to play in 
guiding the direction of the UK in terms of upholding existing rights and remedies in so far as 
it is possible to do so.  
 
 The position of the UK signals to the international arena a disregard (if not, a careless 
approach) towards EU and national citizenship in terms of the domestic enforcement and 
continued protection of rights. This position undermines the UK on the global stage as 
concessions are made to assuage nationalist demands at the expense of global relationships. 
The UK has been subject to scrutiny by UN bodies concerned with the hate filled political 
rhetoric leading the domestic charge against minority groups, which have resulted in a spike 
                                                      
101 See the evidence session to House of Lords Constitutional Committee, PARLIAMENTLIVE.TV, (Feb. 1, 2017), 
http://parliamentlive.tv/event/index/75194d6a-b303-436b-8bd8-e4b1dec58b3f. 
102 European Union (Withdrawal) Bill 2017-8, HC Bill [5] cl. 8, 9, 12 and 21 (UK). 
103 LORAND BARTELS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY CLAUSES IN THE EU’S INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, 
Eᴜʀᴏᴘᴇᴀɴ Pᴀʀʟɪᴀᴍᴇɴᴛ (2005), 
www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/nt/584/584520/584520en.pdf. 
104 Joint Committee on Human Rights, supra note 17, at 9. 
105 As discussed by Catherine Barnard, The Silence of the Charter: Social Rights and the Court of Justice, in 
THE EU CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AS A BINDING INSTRUMENT—FIVE YEARS OLD AND GROWING 173 
(Sybe de Vries  et al. eds., 2015). 
106 Id. 
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in hate crimes around the referendum.107 In the literature, Crawford has highlighted the 
emerging global trend of states retreating from the global sphere by withdrawing from 
international treaties, such as is the case of Brexit, the US withdrawal from the Paris 
Agreement and South Africa’s purported withdrawal from the Rome Statute.108 These 
emerging trends speak to the fragility of international law and the backlash against 
globalisation.109 Nonetheless, as Crawford identifies, withdrawal, or a retreat from 
supranational mechanisms, still requires a role for a supranational dispute resolution.110 In the 
case of Brexit, the rejection of the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
“will have to be replaced by something because there will continue to be a collection of rights 
and regimes that exist to govern relations between the EU and the UK.”111 In this sense there 
is simply no way of fully retreating as an actor on the global stage. The UK will continue to 
be subject to rules and regulations governing its relationship with the EU regardless of what 
demands are placed domestically. 
 
 The conclusion therefore is that the picture is much more complex than a simple 
repeal and replace scheme. The danger is that the current trajectory risks sleepwalking into a 
human rights legal deficit with many EU rights swept away with inadvertent measures or 
deliberate erosion. Yet again, we highlight the importance of genuine and informed 
deliberation of the consequences of Brexit on existing rights and remedies. More so we 
emphasise the potential impact that such a loss will have on those rights holders who are no 
longer able to seek a remedy for a breach of EU derived human rights law when this source 
of law has for decades provided a constitutional pillar of the domestic rights regime. This is a 
constitution in transition without the appropriate safeguards in place.  
 
A. Devolution and Brexit 
 
The futility of the Sewel Convention’s legislative entrenchment as seen in the Miller 
case is a frustrating addition to already unhappy relations between, in particular, the Scottish 
and UK Governments.  The Prime Minister has committed that no decisions currently taken 
by the devolved administrations will be removed and that they will be fully involved in the 
                                                      
107 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, UN Doc. CERD/C/GBR/CO/21-23 at ¶ 15 (Aug. 
2016). The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination raised concerns about the spike in hate 
crimes associated with the referendum noting that the referendum campaign was marked by ‘divisive, anti-
immigrant and xenophobic rhetoric, and that many politicians and prominent political figures not only failed to 
condemn such rhetoric, but also created and entrenched prejudices, thereby emboldening individuals to carry out 
acts of intimidation and hate towards ethnic or ethno-religious minority communities and people who are visibly 
different. 
108 James Crawford, The Current Political Discourse Concerning International Law, 81 MODERN LAW REV. 1, 
22 (2018). 
109 Id. at 2. See also e.g. RICHARD HAASS, A WORLD IN DISARRAY: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE 
CRISIS OF THE OLD ORDER (2017). 
110 Crawford, supra 108, at 17. 
111 Id. 
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Brexit process.112 However, the return of EU competencies does not necessarily mean that the 
devolved competence will expand on a ‘repatriation’ of power from Europe. Similar to the 
potential use (or abuse) of delegated legislation enabled through the EU (Withdrawal) Bill, 
the devolved legislatures may not have much say in where this power goes even for those 
areas within their existing devolved competence, not least because the Sewel Convention 
does not apply even in a political sense to secondary legislation. As the legislation passes 
through Parliament, attempts have been made to ‘assuage’ the devolved legislatures by 
affording the repatriation of powers to the devolved legislatures a statutory footing.113 
 
 What has been apparent is that Brexit poses major constitutional challenges to the 
future of the UK as a unitary state. In the Miller judgment the Court referred to Dicey in 
describing the UK constitution as “the most flexible polity in existence.”114 Likewise, the UK 
Government suggests in its White Paper on Brexit that the UK’s constitutional framework 
reflects the unique circumstances of the world’s most successful and enduring multi-nation 
state.115 Yet constitutional unrest is becoming ever more evident in the devolved 
jurisdictions.  Following an unsuccessful attempt in 2014, the UK-wide decision to leave the 
EU, which was not supported by the majority in Scotland, prompted the Scottish Government 
to call for a second referendum on independence, a plan that has been postponed on the back 
of Scottish National Party losses to pro-Union parties in the 2017 General Election.116   
 
Further, there is a need to resolve border issues with Ireland post-Brexit in a manner 
that does not destabilize Northern Ireland’s peace settlement: issues which have proven 
central to Brexit discussions so far and will remain of enduring concern.117 Any retrogression 
on human rights in Northern Ireland could be a fatal blow to the fragile peace arrangement 
and contrary to the foundations of the Good Friday Agreement human rights framework. The 
fragility of this position is further underscored by the fact that Northern Ireland has been 
without an effective Executive since January 2017 due to domestic discord (underpinned by 
enduring political tensions) over where the responsibility lies regarding a failed clean energy 
scheme resulting in significant losses to the public purse.118 While both the Scottish and 
Welsh Governments have proactively published White Papers on Brexit, albeit that certain 
                                                      
112 Theresa May, Prime Minister, The government's negotiating objectives for exiting the EU, (Jan. 17, 2017), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-governments-negotiating-objectives-for-exiting-the-eu-pm-
speech.  
113 The Government has proposed an amendment to the Bill with the intention of reassuring the devolved 
legislatures that most of the EU powers in devolved areas will be transferred to the devolved jurisdictions after 
withdrawal. David Cornock, Brexit, devolution, the House of Lords & Waldo Williams, BBC NEWS, (Mar. 22, 
2018), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-politics-43499314. 
114 R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5 ¶ 40, [2017] 2 W.L.R. 583. 
115 UK GOVERNMENT (Cm 9417), supra note 69.  
116 Severin Carrell, Nicola Sturgeon shelves second Scottish independence referendum (video), THE GUARDIAN 
(June 27, 2017), www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jun/27/nicola-sturgeon-shelves-second-independence-
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117 For a discussion of issues, see e.g. Colin Murray et al., Discussion Paper on Brexit (2018), 
http://www.nihrc.org/uploads/publications/Discussion_Paper_on_Brexit.pdf. 
118 An Inquiry into the matter was announced on January 24, 2017.See RENEWABLE HEAT INCENTIVE INQUIRY, 
https://www.rhiinquiry.org/. 
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suggestions such as Scotland staying within the single market have been rejected by the UK 
Government,119 the people of Northern Ireland are largely reliant upon the UK and Irish 
Governments to assert their interests rather than any local representation. This includes a 
disproportionate emphasis on the DUP position which receives significant weight as part of 
the Conservative DUP coalition but does not represent the broad spectrum constituting the 
polarised political makeup of Northern Ireland. The constitutional climate is such that despite 
the blow dealt by Miller to any legal requirement to obtain consent from the devolved 
legislatures, a prudent UK Government seeking to solidify the unitary arrangements would 
regard genuine dialogue and the Sewel arrangement of utmost political and practical 
importance. At the time of writing, the UK Government has tabled amendments to the EU 
(Withdrawal) Bill that seek to assuage devolved concerns about the repatriation of EU 
competences by introducing a ‘consent decision’ mechanism before the UK Government can 
pass Regulations engaging with hitherto devolved areas under EU law. Whilst this might 
appear a positive move, it is a procedural requirement with no real substantive bite. In other 
words – even if the devolved legislatures do not consent – once the consent decision is issued 
(whether consensual or non-consensual), the Regulations can lawfully be passed. Scotland 
has rejected this approach. It has attempted to mitigate the damage of a difficult Brexit by 
passing the European Union (Legal Continuity) (Scotland) Bill. This legislation seeks to 
retain the force of EU law in devolved areas, including retaining many of the rights and 
remedies in Scots law after withdrawal as would have been available before withdrawal. This 
include the right of the courts to strike down legislation incompatible with the Charter and 
EU general principles when engaging with EU retained law (clause 5(2)(b)). This, in and of 
itself, has now been regarded as usurping Westminster parliamentary supremacy and a legal 
challenge to the Scottish legislation is on the horizon (on the grounds that it is beyond the 
competence of the Scottish Parliament to legislate to this effect). 
 
III.  REPEAL OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT AND A BRITISH BILL OF RIGHTS 
 
Political and academic discussion on the second human rights reform process has 
been notably more muted since the UK Westminster election of June 2017. In 2015, the 
Cameron Government, elected with a majority, achieved a political mandate for its pledge to 
“scrap the [Human Rights Act 1998] and introduce a British Bill of Rights.”120 Theresa May, 
a long-time critique of the Act and the European Convention on Human Rights, readily 
inherited this commitment, and until early 2017 consultation proposals toward that end were 
awaited.121 According to the Conservative Party’s 2017 Manifesto, which preceded the snap 
election in June, the UK Government no longer intend to repeal or replace the Human Rights 
Act “while the process of Brexit is underway” but promise to “consider [the] human rights 
                                                      
119 Letter from David Davis MP, Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, to Michael Russell MSP, 
Minister for UK Negotiations on Scotland’s Place in Europe (Mar. 29, 2017), 
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www.conservatives.com/~/media/files/downloadable%20files/human_rights.pdf. 
121 See former Justice Secretary Liz Truss interview, BBC RADIO 4 (Aug. 22, 2016), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b07pd4kj. It first appeared the proposal to repeal the Human Rights Act 
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legal framework when the process of leaving the EU concludes.”122 While this turn of events 
explains the recent reduction in discussion concerning the potential repeal of the Human 
Rights Act, criticism of the Act remains an issue of immediate concern. The negativity and 
oscillation surrounding the UK’s human rights legal framework gives the impression, rightly 
or wrongly, of a Government intent on undermining the current level of human rights 
protection. In the very least it is stifling progress as civil society organisations redirect their 
efforts to maintaining the status quo as opposed to re-imagining a more progressive legal 
framework. 
 
As discussed in the introduction, a core discourse underpinning the proposed repeal of 
the Human Rights Act is the repatriation of sovereignty.  It is, in fact, an often celebrated 
aspect of the Human Rights Act that it accords structural respect to parliamentary 
sovereignty, and in turn the will of the UK electorate as expressed through representative 
democracy. The Human Rights Act 1998 came into force in 2000 for the purpose of 
incorporating most of the rights contained within the European Convention on Human Rights 
into domestic law. It functions as the core of the UK’s human rights scheme and is the 
primary domestic instrument utilized by the Westminster to enhance human rights 
protection.123 Since it incorporates rights contained within the European Convention on 
Human Rights, it is an instrument that protects essentially civil and political rights (the 
European Court of Human Rights has stipulated that these rights can have implications of a 
social or economic nature given the indivisible nature of rights).124 The effort to respect 
parliamentary sovereignty manifests in particular in how the statute deals with legislation 
through sections 3 and 4 of the Act.   
 
Section 3 of the Human Rights Act requires courts to interpret legislation in a manner 
that is compatible with European Convention rights in “so far as it is possible to do so.” 
Where this is not deemed possible, section 4 provides that the courts (High Court and above) 
can make a “declaration of incompatibility” between UK primary legislation and the 
Convention. As such, the legal validity of the primary legislation remains intact, unlike with 
secondary legislation, which the courts may strike down. This model of rights protection 
applied by the Act is commonly conceived as a hybrid which sits somewhere between a 
model which rests all the powers of adjudication in the courts with one where the legislature 
has the final say on rights matters.125 There is also a substantial body of literature which 
complements the ‘dialogue’ encouraged between the legislature and the courts by sections 3 
and 4 of the Act.  Indeed, a significant benefit said of dialogic models is their ability to 
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facilitate public deliberation and debate.  Interactions between the courts and the legislature 
can for example serve to highlight a matter in the public domain. 126  
 
 The most detailed account of the criticisms levelled against the Human Rights Act can 
be found in the February 2016 evidence delivered by the then Justice Secretary Michael Gove 
to the House of Lords EU Committee Inquiry on the proposed repeal and introduction of a 
new British Bill of Rights.127  Based on this evidence which contains relatively minor 
alterations, along with the Minister’s comment that human rights have developed “a bad 
name in the public square” due to associations with claims by “unmeritorious individuals” 
and with “foreign intervention” on British courts,128 the EU Committee rightly concluded that 
the motivations behind repealing the Human Rights Act were directed at ensuring human 
rights had a greater national identity rather than increasing human rights protection in the 
UK.  The Committee expressed that it was not clear “why a British Bill of Rights was really 
necessary,” nor was it clear how a British Bill of Rights would address the Justice Secretary’s 
concerns any more than the Human Rights Act.129   
 
 Considering the enormity, both in symbolic and constitutional terms, of the action of 
repealing the Human Rights Act, it might be stressed just how minor the Government’s 
expressed concerns were.  The substantive changes suggested by Gove involve three possible 
clarifications to the law as it stands.  First, it was proposed that a British Bill of Rights would 
ensure that the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights is advisory only.  
Section 2 of the Human Rights Act presently requires that domestic courts “take into 
account” relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence and opinion.  This requirement was interpreted in 
2004 by the House of Lords as a ‘mirror’ principle, meaning that section 2 was to be read as 
having placed a “duty [on] national courts […] to keep pace with the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence as it evolves over time: no more, but certainly no less.”130  The domestic courts 
have however since distanced their approach from this position, interpreting section 2 as 
instead requiring something more akin to consideration of the Strasbourg position.131  When 
queried therefore by the Committee on the continuing relevance of this suggestion, the 
Justice Secretary expressed a desire to avoid future courts returning to the ‘mirror’ 
interpretation.  The second substantive change proposed was a specific derogation from 
Convention rights in times of war.  Derogations from Convention rights are already permitted 
under Article 15 of the Convention with the proviso that it is ‘to the extent strictly required 
                                                      
126 For discussion see Sandra Fredman, From Dialogue to Deliberation: Human Rights Adjudication and 
Prisoners' Rights to Vote, in PARLIAMENTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: REDRESSING THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT 152-
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127 For a summary of the Gove evidence, see HOUSE OF LORDS EU COMMITTEE, supra note 18, ch. 3. 
128 See Michael Gove evidence, EU Cᴏᴍᴍɪᴛᴛᴇᴇ, Inquiry into ‘The Potential Impact on EU Law of Repealing 
Human Rights Act’ (Feb. 2, 2016), Q 79-90, 
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by the exigencies of the situation’ and with a blanket prohibition on derogating from certain 
articles such as those prohibiting torture and slavery.  Based on both prior and subsequent 
Government statements, the underlying desire to derogate is focused on British troops in 
overseas combat zones and is derived from concerns over the application of extraterritoriality 
to the Convention by Strasbourg.132 Yet it is difficult to understand how what has since been 
espoused as a formal ‘presumption to derogate’ from the European Convention in times of 
war, relates or affects the current operation of Article 15.133  Indeed, in October 2016 the UK 
Government formally announced its intention with the qualification that this is “if possible in 
the circumstances that exist at that time.”134  The final substantive clarification expressed in 
evidence concerned a proposed adjustment of the balance accorded to the qualified rights.  
This meant, for example, placing more emphasis on freedom of expression than the right to 
privacy; such modifications were referred to as ‘glosses’ and said to better mimic the 
difference in approach between the UK and continental jurisdictions.135   
 
  Although the focus of the Justice Secretary’s evidence was to give more control to 
British courts vis-a-vis the Strasbourg court, a significant, if not predominant feature of the 
proposals, was to give more control to Parliament.136  Yet despite a number of earlier creative 
interpretations under section 3,137 the practice of the domestic courts is generally considered 
to be respectful of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.  In Dickson’s comprehensive 
review of the UK Supreme Court he refers to the “sense” that the judiciary prefer to issue 
incompatibility declarations which do not change the law over section 3 compatible 
interpretations which would directly contradict the wording of the legislation.138  As a whole, 
the judiciary is cognisant of the democratic arguments and deferential to the views of the 
legislature.  A more curious observation is that Parliament, as a whole, has not been 
challenging the judicial determination on rights.  Since the Human Rights Act came into 
force in October 2000 until the end of July 2017, the UK Government reports 25 final (i.e. 
not the subject of further judicial proceedings) declarations of incompatibility issued by UK 
                                                      
132 See Conservatives (2014), supra note 120, at 7; MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, ‘GOVERNMENT TO PROTECT ARMED 
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courts.  As of July 2017, of these 25, 20 have been remedied or are in the process of remedy, 
while 5 are under consideration as to how to remedy.139  One reason for such a high uptake of 
judicial recommendations could be the force behind the ‘ultimately binding nature’ of the 
Convention, and the availability of the European Court of Human Rights as an alternative 
forum for remedy.140  Another reason could be the simple fact that the issues raised by the 
incompatibility declarations relate to matters not initially considered in the development of 
the legislation.   
 
One somewhat infamous declaration of incompatibility that had, until recently, 
remained outstanding with little agreement between the UK Parliament and both the domestic 
and European courts, concerned the blanket ban on prisoner voting under section 3 of the 
Representation of the People Act 1983.   In Hirst v UK (No. 2), 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 187, 
the European Court of Human Rights determined a blanket ban on prisoner voting rights to 
be incompatible with the right to vote as protected by Article 3 of Protocol 1 of the 
Convention.  The UK courts have likewise issued a declaration of incompatibility in a series 
of cases under section 4 of the Human Rights Act.141 After over a decade of delay, the UK 
Government has only recently come to an arrangement that will likely gain the approval of 
the legislature and which the Council of Europe has accepted as addressing the 
incompatibility. In a fairly limited expansion of voting rights, prisoners under home detention 
curfew and certain prisoners back in the community on license should soon be able to vote.142  
The prisoner voting saga, which is likely to resolve with the reality of an increase of 
approximately 100 additional prisoners with voting rights on any given day,143 portrays a 
tenacious legislature with the capacity to hold a position in opposition to judicial rights 
rulings should it feel compelled to do so.   
 
In sum, the UK Government’s Human Rights Act proposals, such as we understand 
them, appear then to be directed at increasing parliamentary control of human rights.   Yet the 
above discussion understands the Human Rights Act as structurally respectful of 
parliamentary sovereignty and in practical terms notes the strength of Parliament should it 
choose to defy international courts.144  Furthermore, it might be considered ironic that the 
proposals in so far as they might suggest a more restricted role for the judiciary in rights 
adjudication, may serve to decrease public involvement in rights deliberations.  That is 
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because on one view, as the domestic judicial role is restricted, any push into the public 
domain which occurred by virtue of the dialogic nature of rights adjudication in the UK is 
limited.145   It might of course be countered that greater public involvement in rights issues 
could also occur if elected representatives are empowered by the proposed reform to take on 
a stronger leadership role.  In reality, both these suggestions actually cloud an unresolved 
concern of human rights law globally, particularly with respect to its theoretical 
underpinnings.  
 
The origins and foundations of international human rights law have been discussed at 
length in the literature.  For the purposes of this article, it is sufficient to note that human 
rights theory is unresolved on the level of acceptable political contestation.  The recognition 
within the Universal Declaration on Human Rights – a document invoked by the preamble to 
the European Convention of universal rights based on human dignity - is traditionally 
understood to be based on the Enlightenment period natural law interpretation of the nature 
of human beings.146  The result is that human rights are commonly considered to be self-
evident truths deducible by human reason and taken to exist a priori to the political sphere.  
If they pre-exist the political then they cannot be the subject of political contestation.  
However, it has become increasingly common in recent years for human rights theorists to 
argue for a more pragmatic justification based on a pluralist understanding of human 
rights.147  A common thread within these arguments concerns the difficulties of separating 
human beings from their socially situated contexts, and the limited ability of human reason, 
due to the roles played by traditions and emotion, to discern a priori rights should they 
exist.148  The point is that contemporary UK human rights law, which is at least partially 
based on the Universal Declaration, would equally benefit from clearer theoretical 
underpinnings.  It is this issue more than any other that will aid resolution on the question of 
the appropriate role of politics and contestation in human rights law.  
 
Furthermore, although it has been emphasised throughout this section, it is necessary 
to repeat in a more direct manner that the Human Rights Act is a civil and political rights 
statute.  The European Convention was only a first step towards the realisation of the rights 
expressed within the Universal Declaration, and the UK has made limited progress at the 
national level towards incorporating the Declaration’s socio-economic rights into its explicit 
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human rights artillery.  Yet in today’s United Kingdom, it is issues such as housing, health 
and social care provision which dominate the public concern and policy discourse.  
Increasingly, eminent figures in UK public life are calling for the recognition of values that 
are responsive of socio-economic and community orientated needs, in addition to the 
traditional core principles of democracy, the rule of law, and liberty.149  
      
From the above, it might therefore be argued that the repatriation of sovereignty 
discourse which underpins the desire to repeal the Human Rights Act is a misdirected 
frustration at other more legitimate topics within UK human rights law and human rights law 
globally.  The consideration promised by Theresa May of UK human rights law post-Brexit is 
not, as such, a bad thing.  What is suggested is that the consideration of UK human rights law 
should be more fundamental and comprehensive than that proposed by the Government to the 
EU Committee back in 2016.  It should be a consideration of the foundations upon which UK 
human rights law should stand and a genuine effort to develop legislation which reflects the 
contemporary concerns of what it means to have human dignity in the UK today.  A post-
Brexit timing will better ensure that adequate Government resources are available to inform, 
deliberate and interrogate the potential options.  Given the exponential influence wielded by 
state authorities in directing the public mood, the Government has a significant role to play in 
the provision of accurate information to ensure no undue manipulation of this reform process 
and avoid giving human rights “a bad name in the public square.” Certainly the process 
should not be focused on sliding back human rights protections, but rather, should be forward 
looking and try to improve their protection.   
 
A. Devolution, repeal of the Human Rights Act and a British Bill of Rights 
 
One of the greatest issues concerning any potential repeal of the Human Rights Act is 
the risk it could pose in undermining the Northern Ireland peace settlement.  The Good 
Friday Agreement 1998 is committed to by the UK and Irish Governments in an international 
treaty lodged with the UN, and promises the incorporation of the European Convention and 
direct access to the courts for Convention breaches.150  It is also the view in many quarters 
that an indigenous Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland has been outstanding for almost twenty 
years; a view that emanates from provisions within the Agreement.151  Calls for a Northern 
Ireland Bill of Rights have grown stronger in the wake of efforts to progress a British Bill of 
Rights,152 and it is of note that the Northern Ireland Bill of Rights proposals drawn up by the 
Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission also contain many more rights than are 
currently protected under the ECHR or EU system (including better protection of economic, 
social and cultural rights). The proposals to repeal the Human Rights Act and establish a 
British Bill of Rights therefore have the potential to cause serious constitutional and political 
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disruption for Northern Ireland in exchange for what appears to be a limited benefit in terms 
of rights protections.153   
 
 More generally, there has been a clear divergence of trajectories across the UK in 
terms of the protection of human rights. In Scotland, there is a commitment to an extended 
version of socio-economic rights protection and a new power has been devolved to Scotland 
which will allow the Scottish Parliament to enforce a socio-economic equality duty in 
devolved matters.  The new duty, now called the Fairer Scotland Duty, comes into force in 
April 2018.154  In January 2018, the Scottish Government also took proactive steps to 
advance human rights protections by establishing an Advisory Group to the First Minister.155 
The socio-economic equality duty power has also been devolved to Wales under the Wales 
Act 2017 and will commence alongside the reserved powers model in April 2018.156  And 
despite the lack of general competence thus far under the Welsh devolution arrangements, the 
Welsh Assembly has been able to develop legislation which actually increases the protection 
of human rights by incorporating a duty to have due regard to the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, an action that has been influential in other devolved regions.157   
 
The strongest political case for a legislative consent motion rests with the 
establishment of any new human rights framework, such as a British Bill of Rights.  This is 
because (i) human rights are a devolved matter and (ii) a new British Bill of Rights would 
inevitably alter the competences of the devolved Ministers and legislatures.158  Yet what can 
be taken from the above discussion is that each of the devolved regions is on a very different 
human rights trajectory, with Scotland and Wales in particular making moves towards 
stronger enforcement, and Northern Ireland presenting its own unique complexities. 
Constitutional reform at the national level that seeks to make only minor changes in a 
constitutionally significant way may not be enough to solve the diverging trajectory issue. If 
national reform is not progressive in terms of underpinning human dignity and embracing 
broader socio-economic rights, it risks “further fragmenting an already fragmented UK and 
                                                      
153 Hᴏᴜsᴇ ᴏf Lᴏʀᴅs EU Cᴏᴍᴍɪᴛᴛᴇᴇ, supra note 18, at 183. 
154 (Scotland) Act 2016 § 38.  The Scottish Government completed a consultation on bringing the power into 
operation in November 2017, see GOVERNMENT OF SCOTLAND, CONSULTATION ON THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC DUTY: 
ANALYSIS OF RESPONSES (Nov. 2017), http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0052/00527914.pdf. The duty was first 
established under the Equality Act 2010, section 1 but was never commenced.  
155 See Gᴏᴠᴇʀɴᴍᴇɴᴛ ᴏf Sᴄᴏᴛʟᴀɴᴅ, Aᴍʙɪᴛɪᴏɴ ᴏɴ Hᴜᴍᴀɴ Rɪɢʜᴛs (Jan. 17, 2018), 
https://news.gov.scot/news/ambition-on-human-rights. 
156 The Wales Act 2017 § 45; and The Wales Act 2017 (Commencement No. 4) Regulations 2017, available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2017/1179/pdfs/uksi_20171179_en.pdf. 
157 Children and Young Persons (Wales) Measure 2011. This was made possible through the conferred power 
on social welfare which included securing the rights of children. See The National Assembly for Wales 
(Legislative Competence) (Social Welfare and Other Fields) Order 2008 W.S.I. 2008/3132. See also, Children 
and Young People (Scotland) Act 2014 §§ 1 & 2. 
158 Note that arguments also exist that a legislative consent motion is required to repeal the Human Rights Act 
1998, available at https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/pdfs/ukpga_19980042_en.pdf.  
27 
 
could potentially leave those living in England with even less access to rights or remedies 
compared to” the UK’s other constituent parts.159 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The constitutional character of both the Human Rights Act 1998, the European 
Communities Act 1972 and the devolved statutes are now well-established pillars of the UK 
domestic constitution and together form a critical foundational framework for fundamental 
rights in the UK.  The common law, while recently reasserting itself as another source of 
rights protection, 160 is not sufficient to substitute the pillars of the long established European 
frameworks.161 Worryingly the UK risks sleepwalking into a legal deficit with the Brexit 
process potentially sweeping away, either inadvertently or deliberately, the existing EU 
human rights regime without adequate parliamentary scrutiny.  
 
 The UK must take time to assess the potential pitfalls and introduce appropriate 
safeguards when engaging with constitutional and human rights reform, not least in relation 
to the sanctity of the nation state in and of itself. Interestingly the withdrawal from European 
legal frameworks by the UK demonstrates that it is not just a matter of renegotiating 
relationships at a supra-national level. Pursuing constitutional reform also requires careful 
consideration of the impact on each of the constitutional components of the nation at the sub-
national level. The UK devolved entities each carry their own distinct constitutional 
character. Failure to take these positions into account could be perilous – particularly in the 
context of the Scottish independence debate and the Northern Ireland peace process.  
 
 The proposal to revisit the future of human rights in the post-Brexit landscape need 
not however be viewed entirely negatively. Taking the above cautionary warnings into 
account, there is the possibility of increasing the accessibility and public understanding of 
UK human rights law by opening the debate for genuine informed, participative and inclusive 
deliberation on potential reform creating a space for ownership of human rights amongst the 
UK public. Many believe that the constitutional principle of the rule of law includes a 
commitment to human rights and future reform should present as an opportunity to ask to 
what extent human rights protections might be increased rather than diminished.  There could 
be, for example, an opportunity to genuinely embrace stronger protections for social rights – 
something which is already happening at the devolved level.  We propose therefore that the 
opportunity to re-imagine a constitutional settlement for rights across the UK should be 
grasped, with the existing substantive rights acting as a minimum threshold (an ‘ECHR-EU 
+’ model). In other words – the nature of the UK constitution means that leaving the EU and 
reforming the human rights structure should not, as a matter of principle and a matter of law, 
result in the diminishing of rights (unless parliament expressly says so).  It is vital to re-
imagine the law in a manner that is responsive to the perceived needs of human dignity, and 
in that regard, this article advocates that a re-imagined human rights framework includes as 
its ‘plus’, in the very least, a greater protection for those rights derived from the EU pillars as 
                                                      
159 See Katie Boyle, What are the consequences for human rights if we change our relationship with the EU?, 
Eᴄᴏɴᴏᴍɪᴄ ᴀɴᴅ Sᴏᴄɪᴀʟ Rᴇsᴇᴀʀᴄʜ Cᴏᴜɴᴄɪʟ - Exᴘʟᴀɪɴᴇʀ (Apr. 2016), https://ukandeu.ac.uk/explainers/what-are-
the-consequences-for-human-rights-if-we-change-our-relationship-with-the-eu/.  
160 See e.g. Lady Hale, supra note 32. 
161 See Elliott, supra note 140. See also Brice Dickson, Repeal the HRA and Rely on the Common Law?, in THE 
UK AND EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS: A STRAINED RELATIONSHIP? 124,131 (K. S. Ziegler et al. eds.,2015). 
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well as the broader international human rights framework, including economic, social and 
cultural rights.  
   
Whilst Westminster parliamentary committees have already commenced scrutiny of 
human rights reform and should continue to maximise their available resources in this regard, 
it is imperative that increased safeguards in the legislative process be introduced.  For 
example, a presumption against any delegated legislation that engages with the broad EU 
human rights framework, resulting in a much wider exemption than currently exists in the EU 
(Withdrawal) Bill, would be advisable. Whatever form human rights law takes in the UK’s 
future constitutional makeup, political legitimacy in a difficult and polarised constitutional 
climate means reform must be preceded by a lengthy deliberative process across the 
jurisdictions that is fair, participative, democratic and informed.  While ambitious, such a 
process should not shy away from the theoretical underpinnings of human rights, asking the 
public what it means to them to be human today and how this vision might be better reflected 
in our national and devolved laws for the benefit of all.  
   
